Aluminum to Silicon
Part IV: Know Your Index, or Why Compute Markets are Tough to Trade and Easy to Manipulate
Ok so here's a classic puzzle in the world of statistics and housing markets: in City XYZ, the cheaper homes (let's say, in the suburbs) were up 10% last year, while the more expensive homes (downtown) were up an even spicier 15%. So how is it possible that the average price of homes was DOWN 21% year over year in this city?
The answer is mix shift. Look up Simpson's Paradox. Average sales price of homes could easily have declined year over year if the underlying mix of homes shifted from predominantly higher priced homes to predominantly lower priced homes (maybe a lot more of them transacted, or more were built). The same thing happens in compute: if a pile of cheaper, older H100 capacity happens to rent in a given hour, a GPU price index can drop even though nobody's price changed.
This illustrates one of many reasons why index construction is actually an insanely difficult exercise to do well. In compute markets, as in real estate, the choice of index can matter as much as the asset itself.
So, believe me when I say there's no single thing that is "The Price of a Home" in a given market, instead, there's actually two different ways to measure it: a repeat-sales index (Case-Shiller, for example) or a hedonic index (Zillow Zestimates). A repeat-sales index is what it sounds like: it tracks longitudinally single assets and tracks repeat transactions and how those prices move over time. A hedonic index uses every sale and statistically adjusts each price for the home's attributes (square footage, bedrooms, lot size, location, and so on), so that a 3-bedroom ranch and a 5-bedroom colonial can be translated into the same constant-quality unit.
No approach is perfect.
Repeat-sales indices are clean in the sense that they compare like with like, but a) they only ever see homes that actually trade, and b) they only count a home once it has traded twice. In a market where turnover has collapsed (today's market, for example), no actual person believes that transacted homes are representative of how actual housing stock is trending. Repeat-sales indices also overstate appreciation, especially when owners renovate between sales, since the index can't tell a new kitchen from a rising market.
The cleanest real-world example I know of is San Francisco coming out of the financial crisis: Case-Shiller, which only sees homes that trade, swung from down 32% year over year in January 2009 to up 18% by April 2010, largely because of which homes happened to be trading (foreclosure sales first, then a rush to beat the 2010 homebuyer tax credit), while Zillow's index of every home went from down 15% to roughly flat.
Hedonic indices, on the other hand, use all the data and can price homes that never trade, but they're only as good as the model, and whoever chooses the attributes and the functional form is, in effect, choosing the answer. Some common blind spots: a) anything the model doesn't measure (condition, view, renovation quality) leaks straight into the "price change," b) the coefficients go stale as buyers' tastes shift (home offices after COVID, for example), and c) they still only see homes that sold, so they adjust for the mix of what traded but not for which homes trade at all.
Compute indices map onto these somewhat loosely. It turns out nobody runs a true repeat-sales index for compute yet. Meanwhile, Silicon Data's indices are hedonic in nature. Ornn is closer to a third type of index, a commodity price-reporting index (think of an oil benchmark or SOFR): rather than adjusting anything, it excludes whatever isn't comparable and averages the realized trades that are left, which makes it, in effect, a "filtered average sale price" index.
1. Who's publishing the reference indices, and how
The two names that matter most right now are Silicon Data and Ornn, largely because each is attached to a futures venue.
Silicon Data's H100 Rental Index launched in May 2025, and CME Group's proposed compute futures (listed via NYMEX, now slated for January) would settle on a monthly average of its H100 index. Methodologically it's the hedonic approach:
- Inputs include both executed transactions and verified executable listings, across spot, on-demand, and reserved terms
- Every record is "basis-adjusted" to a benchmark on-demand contract for rental type, geography, CPU platform, and GPU variant, because, in their own words, simple averages would swing with the daily mix
- Adjusted prices are averaged by provider and then weighted across providers, and the adjustment model is recalibrated weekly, so the hedonic coefficients themselves move over time
Ornn's Compute Price Index (OCPI), on the other hand, works like a commodity price-reporting index, and its indices are on Bloomberg (tickers ORNNH100 and ORNNB200), with ICE's proposed compute futures pending CFTC review:
- It's built only from realized prices on active on-demand rentals reported by contributing providers, as a volume-weighted, winsorized average over a rolling one-hour window
- Reserved and long-term contracts are excluded, and it publishes a single global number rather than regional ones
- The formula is public, but the winsorization level, verification thresholds, and contributor list are confidential
In practice, the two have landed close to each other: in mid-November 2026, Silicon Data had the H100 at about $3.13 per GPU-hour and Ornn at about $3.06 (after settling at $3.29 just two days earlier). That sounds reassuring until you remember how differently they're built, which means the agreement tells you as much about the adjustment model as it does about the market.
It's like we always said internally on the finance team at Ramp: "He who controls the model, controls the narrative."
2. The same blind spots, in silicon
A transaction-average index like Ornn's is the City XYZ problem in silicon: it reflects real clearing prices, which is its strength, but it averages whatever happened to trade in the window, so a shift in which providers, configurations, or regions happen to be renting that hour moves the print even if no individual price changed. Imagine if a batch of early-2023 H100s traded in one hour and a batch of 2025 H100s traded in the next. This hardware is known to command quite significant differences in pricing on the market (As I like to tell my wife, "Not all first-edition Charizards are created equal." This is usually when she walks away...)
A hedonic index like Silicon Data's controls for that mix, but it then depends on the adjustment model.
A true repeat-sales index for compute, which would track the same provider's same configuration over time, probably would be the cleanest of all, except that the market is currently thin, offers get delisted, and providers upgrade their networking and software stacks between observations, which is the compute version of renovating the kitchen between sales.
None of this is a criticism of any particular provider, since every index involves these tradeoffs. It turns out this also makes each of these indices uniquely manipulable.
3. Assume they're being gamed
If there's one thing finance has taught me about benchmarks, it's that any number against which there are real dollars at stake will eventually attract people trying to move it. LIBOR was a contributor-submitted benchmark, and the panel banks submitting it were found to have manipulated it for years; therefore, any compute index built on contributed data (which describes most of them) deserves the same skepticism. Every construction method has its own soft spot: listings can be spoofed, trades can be washed, and hedonic attributes can be mislabeled. How much enforcement exists against bad actors right now? Hard to say. Furthermore, the markets are thin enough that a single large contributor can matter.
This isn't hypothetical. Kalshi has already listed compute contracts on H100, H200, B200, and RTX 5090 rental prices settling against Ornn's indices, and Polymarket has listed Ornn-settled H100 contracts too. That's a real step forward for price discovery, but it also means real money now settles against a single print, and there is every incentive for someone with P&L on the line to "curate" (that's a euphemism) where that print lands.
The better precedent for transaction-based compute indices, though, is probably the 2013 FX fix scandal rather than LIBOR. Transaction-based indices like Ornn's are harder to fake, since only realized prices count. However, the forex traders who rigged the WM/Reuters fix didn't fabricate anything either: they coordinated real trades inside the short window when the benchmark was calculated. A compute index calculated from a rolling one-hour window in a thin market has the same exposure, and therefore anyone holding a futures position worth more than the cost of renting GPUs at off-market prices for an hour has an economic reason to move the print.
None of this means anyone's doing it today. The tell to watch is whether the volume of futures settling against these indices starts to dwarf the spot volume underneath them, because once the money riding on the index is much larger than the money it costs to move it, every one of these vectors gets cheap, and that's how benchmark manipulation has started in most markets before this one.
A quick word on winsorization. Winsorizing is a way to stop a few crazy numbers from dragging an average around without throwing them away. That's great protection against fat fingers and one-off junk prints, but it's much weaker against a determined participant. Pushing lots of trades a little higher, all inside the band, passes straight through; trading enough volume at your own price drags the band itself toward you, since the band is calculated from that same volume; and in a thin hour with only a handful of trades, the percentiles rest on so little data that one participant can effectively be the distribution.
Token indices are the clearest example of this today, and in my view they're already distorted. Most of them are usage-weighted, which makes them the "Case-Shiller problem" in its purest form. Silicon Data's LLM Token Expenditure Index (Bloomberg: SDLLMTK), for instance, has slid to about $0.80 per million tokens as of mid-November 2026, roughly 60% below its May peak of about $2.10, and Silicon Data's own page notes that the index moves even when individual model prices are unchanged, because a usage-weighted index falls whenever usage shifts toward cheaper models, regardless of whether any individual model got cheaper. And usage has shifted dramatically, as providers flood routed volume with free or heavily subsidized "stealth" test models that regularly top OpenRouter's rankings before anyone knows who made them.
Some indices are built to filter that out; Ornn's Token Price Index, for example, excludes free tiers and thin-coverage days, but it's still volume-weighted within each lab and only sees traffic routed through OpenRouter, priced at posted rather than negotiated rates. Meanwhile, list prices per token actually rose on most model tiers over the past year, even as the cost per unit of capability fell sharply, so depending on whether you weight by usage, list price, or capability, you can tell three completely different stories about whether tokens are getting cheaper.
4. So What Now?
If you're lending against GPUs, hedging compute costs, or writing an index into a lease, you should assume someone is going to try to screw you at some point, which is of course the credit investor in me talking. Keep in mind the following:
- Know exactly which index you're referencing, whether it's built from listings, transactions, or a hedonic model, who contributes the data, how it's weighted, and how outliers are handled
- Of course, backtest. A classic ratings agency exercise is basically to figure out what happens in a P90, P95, or P99 scenario.
- Reference more than one index, since Silicon Data and Ornn measure different things, and a divergence between them is information rather than noise.
- Write fallbacks into the documents from day one, because the LIBOR transition showed how painful it is to retrofit a replacement benchmark into thousands of contracts after the fact. I spent more time than I'd like to admit negotiating LIBOR replacement language during the early days of Ramp, first against Goldman Sachs, then against Citi. In retrospect it was worth it.
- Prefer quality-adjusted measures for anything long-dated, which ties directly back to why physical hardware grading matters: a hedonic compute index is only as good as its attributes, and longitudinal physical condition is the attribute nobody is measuring yet.
Housing investors learned a long time ago that the index you quote is a choice, not a fact. Compute investors are about to learn the same thing.
Anyway this was a fun little detour. We're going to come back to the world of ABS and GPU debt deals in the next few blog installments. Need to circle back on a few topics within the world of capital markets infra etc.